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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
1.1  PURP OSE
The purpose of this report is to document the activitil:7.-
volved in the implementation of the GELS-11 operation,
the operational performance of the ground elements and descrll.•_
the in-orbit performance of each spacecraft and geodetic oystem.
Performance data are presented for the period from launch thr^ur,-
31 July 1968.
1. 2 BACKGROUND
GEOS-11 is the second in a series of active geodetic space-
craft to be launched tinder the National Geodetic Satellite Plio-
gram (NG8P). Like its predecessor, GEOS-1., it is contributing t
the achievement of the objectives of the NGSP.
The specific NASA Pre-launch Mission Objectives for the
GEOS-II spacecraft are
Primary Objectives
To inject the spacecraft into an approximate
1100 Ian by 1525 Ian orbit at an inclination
of about 1060(790 retrograde) and obtain
gravity gradient stabilization.
• To obtain ninety days of precision space-
craft position data to be applied to the
gravimetric objectives of the NGSP.
0 To support the geodetic positioning of
forty reference control points and approxi-
mately sixty-four densification observation
sites.
• To support the calibration of certain ground
based C-Band radars and evaluate their accu-
in
racy for use as geodetic instrumentation
oystems.
Sedan , Objectives
• operate the primary instrumentation for
a minimum of nine months.
• Obtain post-launch observation data to be
applied to the NGSP (i.e., improvement of
worldwide geodetic datum accuracies and
positional accuracies of satellite track-
Ing sites, studies of the earth's gravita-
tional field, and intercomparison of satel-
lite tracking system accuracies).
• To study the effect of the atmospheve on
a CW laser beam.
With the issuing of the GEOS-II Post Launch Mis5ion OperU-
tion Report (MOR) No. 3 1, dated 26 July 1968, the GEOS ­I1 missior
was adjudged a success in accordance with the primary pre-launct
mission objectives by the NASA Management. The achievements In
the mission activity to allow this assessment are included in
this document.
1.3 GEOS-11 SPACECRAFT iNSTRUMENTATION
The GEOS--II instrumentation, complement is substantially the
same as GEOS-I. however, GEOS-II carries additional instrumenta-
tion as summarized below-.
Spacecraft
II
• Primary_ Instrumentation
Laser Reflectors
Dopp ler Beacons (3)
• Secondary Instrum-enta-l-.ion
Laser Detector
Solar Science Electron Detector
The spacecraft systems used to operate and monitor the in-
strumentation are also substantially the same as those flown on
GEOS-I and consist o- IL' the following:
• Spacecraft Systems
Attitude Control
Attitude Detection
Power and Solar Array Monitor
Telemetry
Command
Memory
A block diagram of GEOS-II is shown in Figure 1-1. The per-
formance of each of the above mentioned spacecraft and instrumen-
tation systems is discussed in Section 3 of this document. A
description of the systems is not given, however, as this may
be obtained from Report Number R -4035-45-2., "Plan of Operations
for the GEOS-B (II) Spacecraft," by Communications	 Systems,
Incorporated ., dated October 1967.
1.4 MISSION EVENTS,
A. chronology of the mission events is as follows:
• Launched
	
1/11/687
• Achieved Mission Attitude	 1/15/68
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e System Checking Phase Initiated	 1/16/68
Mission Operations Initiated
	 2/20/68.
From launch through the system checking phase, the primary
spacecraft control responsibility resided with the spacecraft
contractor, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Labora-
tory. The purpose of this phase was to erect the spacecraft in
the gravity gradient mission attitude and determine the status
of all spacecraft subsystems. Data obtained during this phase
were used to establish operational guidelines for use in the
mission operations of the spacecraft.
With the initiation of mission operations, the responsibility
for primary spacecraft control was assumed by the Goddard Space
Flight Center, Geodetic Operations Control Center (GOCC). This
activity constitutes a major addition to the GOCC workload for
GEOS-II over that performed for GEOS-I. Section 2 of this docu-
ment reviews the activities involved in implementing this respon-
sibility and describes the operational performance of the ground
elements through the report period.
1
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SECTION 2
SPACECRAFT CONTROL AND MISSION OPERATIONS
2.1 GENERAL
The ground control functions required to operate GEOS-II do
not differ greatly from those of GEOS-I. However, a major change
was implemented for GEOS-II with the acceptance by Goddard Space
Flight Center of a project request to place primary spacecraft
control responsibility within the GSFC Geodetic Operations Con-
trol. Center (GOCC) . For GEOS -I the primary responsibility for
spacecraft control resided with the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory.
The shift of spacecraft control responsibility to the GOCC
required the design of new operations and the acquiring of equip-
ment, software, and technical capability to support them. In
addition, the GOCC retained the responsibilities performed for
the GEOS-I mission operation and, therefore, was required to im-
plement these operational areas to support GEOS-II. Finally,
because of additional GEOS-II instrumentation (C-Band and Laser
Detector), the GOCC was required to implement operations in
these areas.
I
As a prelude to the project proposal to-effect the above
change for GEOS-II, a study was undertaken by Communications
Systems, Incorporated, to determine the equipment, manpower, and
software requirements. At the termination of this study, recom-
.mendations were made in the form of a plan to be used by the NASA
Project Manager as the basis for requesting GSFC acceptance of the
responsibility for the operation of GEOS-B (II) from the GOCC.
With the exception of a data reduction operation, the plan was
viewed by GSFC Management to be completely feasible and was
accepted
A detailed document entitled "Plan of Operations for the
GEOS-B Spacecraft" was then prepared by COS to aid in implement-
ing the operations at the GOCC related to spacecraft control and
2-1
mission operations. The plan delineated, in flow chart form,
the interrelations between GOCC, other supporting GSFC elements
and the participating networks. The integrated operations dia-
gram for the GEOS-B (II) operation, extracted from the plan, is
shown in Figure 2-1. The NASA-GSFC Operations Plan, which de-
tails the operational procedures to be used by all project par-
ticipants, includes portions of the plan.
In summary, the required GEOS-II operations were implemented,
by the GOCC. It is the intent of this section to more fully de-
scribe this activity and the operational performance through the
period covered by this report.
2.2 SPACECRAFT CONTROL AND SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
In that the additions to the GSFC responsibilities, over
those which were performed for GEOS-I, were mainly in the con-
trol arep., a significant effort at GSFC and within the GOCC was
devoted to implementing the following:
• Telemetry and Commanding Operation
• Injection Operation.
Implementation of operations to support Spacecraft Control
and Mission Operations were also required as follows:
• Operational Computing
• Data Reduction Operation.
The Operational Computing was implemented at GSFC and, with
a few additions, is similar to that performed at GSFC for GEOS-I.
Though proposed as an addition to the GSFC workload for
GEOS-II, the Data Reduction Operation was not accepted by GSFC
and, therefore, is being accomplished by JHU/APL.
f
	
	
The following paragraphs describe the activities involved
in the aforementioned operations.
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2.2.1 Telemetry and Commanding Operations
Although not explicitly stated in the title of this opera-
tion, the key to this activity is technical capability to effect
optimum spacecraft use and spacecraft system maintenance.
The project proposal in this area was as follows:
I. Spacecraft Diagnostics
• Provide two engineers to GOCC
• Spacecraft engineer
• Timing engineer
• Retain JHU/APL on a consulting basis
II. Primary Teiemetry Acquisition
• Utilize existing real-time communications
from STADAN
{
F
• Provide real-time telemetry Data Display
equipment in GOCC
• Utilize all STADAN stations and communications
III. Primary Command Control
• Exercise complete command control within GOCC
• Spacecraft Mode Determination
• Routine Operational Commands
• Emergency Commands
• Execute commands at existing STADAN stations.
The following paragraphs describe the implementation and
performance in these areas
2.2.1.1 Spacecraft Diagnostics
The requirements involved in satisfying the spacecraft
diagnostic task were probably the most critical of the new areas
assumed by the GOCC. The ultimate responsibility of this task is
s_w	
2-4
................ 	 .
ito provide efficient use of the spacecraft instrumentation and
to maintain, where possible, spacecraft health.. An as00 0ci tcr;
,responsibility is that of maintaining spacecraft timing through
analysis of spacecraft oscillator frequency data and STADAN sta-
tion GEOS-II time recovery data.
	 f
The key requirements in implementing this task were:
• Provision of GOCC technical capability commen-
surate with the responsibilities involved.
• Provision of a computerized routine to allow
rapid conversion of telemetry quick-look data
to engineering units.
• Pro ,: ision of a computerized routine to allow
.	 efficient handling of time recovery data.
• Provision of spacecraft oscillator frequency
data for clock normalizationur oses.p p
With the exception of the last item, oscillator frequency data,
the above items were effectively implemented by the GOCC comple-
ment, with diagnostic responsibility assumed on 20 February 1968,
the date when mission operations were initiated. Because the
only direct way of measuring spacecraft oscillator frequency is
via measurements of the doppler beacon frequency, this require-
ment was provided for by the Project Office through negotiations
with the Naval Air Systems Command. Oscillator frequency read-
ings, a routine output of doppler data computations, are submitted
to the GOCC by the APL as a result of these negotiations.
In order to periodically review the technical status of
r	 GEOS-II, a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was formed with repre-
sentatives of APL, GOCC, and the Project Office participating.
The TAG meetings, held nominally on the second and fourth
F
Wednesday of the month, provide for up-to-date problem reporting
and coordinated remedial activities through the assignment of
action items to the participants. The project plan of retaining
2-5
AFL on a consulting basis for the lifetime of the spacecraft is
effected primarily through the TAG meetings and related action
assignments.
9001
2.2.1.2	 Primary Telemetry Acquisition
a.
To provide the nieans for controlling the spacecraft, house-
keeping telemetry data acquisition, over and above that provided
in the GOCC for GEOS-I. was required.
	 For GEOS-1, a near real-
time quick-look mode of telemetry data reporting was conducted
using the NASA Worldwide Communications Network to obtain tele- the
type reports from various STADAN stations,
	 Because of the need
for real-time data to more effectively evaluate spacecraft status
(by viewing actual strip charts rather than reports derived from.
strip charts) the GOCC was required to provide real-time data
links for use by the spacecraft engineers.	 The project proposed
that this requirement be satisfied by establishing data lines
in the GOCC (routed from existing terminals in GSFC) and provid-
in 	 appropriate eqt,,,ipment to reduce the FM data to analog strip
chart.	 However, because of space limitations within the GOCC
and the availability of existing equipment and data lines in the
GSFC Multi-Satellite Operations Centrol Center (MSOCC), the GOCC
implemented this requirement through utilization of the MSOCC t.
capabilities.
	 The real-time mode of telemetry data acquisition
has been used frequently by the GOCC spacecraft engineers.	 The
primary data transmission ' mode used is the microwave links be-
tween the ROSMAN and ULASKA STADAN stations and the GSFC MSOCC,
2.2-1.3	 Primary Command Control,
With the acceptance of complete spacecraft control within
the GOCC, as proposed, the STADAN command facilities provide a
near exclusive command link between the GOCC and the spacecraft.
While mode commanding of GEOS-II requires no unique STADAN equip-
Y.
ment or talents, the increased responsibilities in the GOCC and
the addition of payloads on GEO I>-II have caused a sizable command
schedule to be coordinated and implemented daily (about thirty
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colulands per day ). This scheduling plus the scheduling of mission
operations for the transponder, Laser Detector, Laser and &SED
instrumentation poses a complex coordination task. Throughout
the mi^--Wion operations of GEOS-II, this task has been handled by
the GOCC staff in a most efficient manner.
2.2,)2 1U. ect	 Operations,
The purpose of this operation is) to provide daily programming
of the GEOS-11 memory to allow execution of the scheduled optical
beacon flashes at the proper time.
The project proposal to GSFC in this area was as follows:
• Prepare injection tape at GSFC
• Perform injections at ROSMAN STADAN station
• Implement ROSMAN as the GEOS-B (II) timing
Station.
These proposed additions were also accepted with implemen-
tation and performance as described in the following paragraphs.
2.2.2.1	 Injection Tape
An integral part of the injection operation is the provision
of an injection tape compatible with the injection station equip-
ment.	 This tape contains the output of the Mutual Visibility
Flash Schedule (i.e.,, flash times, number of lamps and length of
sequence) and clock normalization information to be injected into
-the GEOS-II memory.	 Wormally, the tapes are produced once each
week, providing seven injection tapes to be used at the specified
time each day.
The responsibility for providing an injection tape program
was placed within the GSFC Mission and Trajectory Analysis Divi-
sion (MTAD).	 The program was modeled after an existing APL pro-
gram and has provided injection tapes for all injections since
the initiation of operations on 20 February 1968.
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2.2.2.2 Injection Station
It was initially prop ,sed by the project that memory injec-
tions be accomplished utilizing planned new equipment at the
ROSMAN station, and Programmable Command Generator (PCG). How-
ever, installation of the PCG at ROSMAN was found not to be in
the time frame of GEOS-II. Therefore, the NASA Project Office
suggested that an APL fabricated GEOS Explorer Memory Terminal
Unit (GEMTU) be placed at ROSMAN to be used as the prime memory
injection equipment.
It was planned that the ROSMAN GEMTU would perform memory
injections starting 20 February 1968, the day mission operations
were initiated and GOCC assumed full control of the spacecraft:.
however, because it is necessary to provide operations and main-
tenance information with any new piece of equipment placed in
the STADAN, a delay Was experienced because of the lack of this
documentation.
Project representatives coordinated a plan between APL and
GSFC to effect GEMTU installation at ROSMAN as soon after 20
February as possible, using a preliminary set of APL produced
documentation on an interim basis.
The aforementioned preliminary documentation was provided
GSFC on 23 February. After review by GSFC personnel and the
addition of a few minor items to enhance understanding cf the
logic block diagrams, the preliminary documentation was con-
sidered to be sufficient to warrant installation of GEMTU at
ROSMAN and subsequent initiation of operations.
CTPV' U was trucked from APL to ROSMAN on 7 and 8 March 1968.
On li March, under the supervision of an AFL engineer, GEMTU was
installed. Injections on 12 through 15 March were performed
using the ROSMAN GEMTU with the APL, using a second GEMTU at the
Howard County station, acting as an active backu-). The backup
capability was not required on any of the initial injections, as
the ROSMAN GEMTU and operators performed as required
With the injection of 16 ,March 1968, the ROSMAN station
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utilizing GEMTU became the primary injection station for GEE S-J i;.
ROSMAN is also capable of backing up a failure in GEMTU by utiliz -
ing a proven injection system incorporating the OAO unique An/ECS
computer system and peripheral equipment. An additional backup
system, available on a forty-eight hour call-up basis, is the
APL GEMTU located at the APL Howard County Station.
Since the beginning of injection operations at ROSMAN,
there have been no serious problems. However, a requirement for
formal documentation, a GEMTU Operations and Maintenance Manuai,
still exists. This manual is presently being developed by APL..
2.2.2.3 Timing Stat ion
One-of the requirements of the optical investigators of the
GEOS-II project is to know the time bias of any given GEOS-II
flash sequence with reference to UTC.
The GEOS-II memory system provides a burst of time modula-
tion on the 136
-MHz, 162-MHz and 324-MHz frequencies once each
minute. Proper detection of this modulation will allow the ground
observer to determine the occurrences of the spacecraft minute
mark. The optical beacon flashes are initiated on the space-
craft minute mark, defined as Word 1 Bit 1 of the GEOS memory
operation. Therefore, comparison of the spacecraft minute mark
to a reference time at a ground station (synchronized to UTC)
i	 will allow' determination of GEOS-II flashes with respect to UTC.
In view of the above, an additional responsibilitu y of the
•GOCC was the establishment of a timing station with the capa-
bility o:,' accurately synchronizing the station clock to UTC and
comparing the spacecraft clock to the station clock.
The GSFC implemented the ROSMAN station as the GDS -II tim-
ing station:., The ROSMAN station clock can be accurately synchro-
nized to the GSFC atomic standard, which, in turn, is synchronized
to UTC by transmission of timing data over the GSFC/ROSMAN micro-
wave communications link. Once properly synchronized, ROSMAN
utilizes a GEOS time recovery unit (equipment fabricated during
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GEOS-I lifetime) to detect the spacecraft minute mark and com-
pare it with the station minute mark, thus, providing the data
required for GOCC to obtain time biases of GEOS with respect to
UTC for use by the optical investigators
2.2.3 Operational Computing
Because of the addition of the C-Band transponders on GEr;S-
II, the NASA Project Office proposed that the computational sup-
port for station predictions required by the C-Band Network be
added to the Operational Computing at GSFC. This proposal was
accepted and implemented.
Since the initiation of mission operations, all networks
have been serviced in a routine and efficient manner. A summary
of the support provided in this area is listed below:
SECOR Network
Operational look angle predictions for approximately six
stations.
STABAN
Operational look angle predictions for ten minitrack, four
GRARR and approximately two laser ,locations.
C-Band Network
a. Long range Mutual Visibility C-Band Station Predictions
(MUSTAP) for seven participating agencies incorporating approxi-
mately sixteen locations.
b. Operational look angle predictions for approximately
sixteen locations
JHU/APL
Station look angle predictions for the Howard County station.
2.2.4 Data Reduction Operation
The purpose of this operation is to enable computerized
reduction of GEOS-II telemetry data recorded on magnetic tape.
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In general, the GEOS-II telemetry channel allocations are de-
voted to spacecraft system housekeeping parameters. Therefore,
there is not a requirement for routine telemetry data reduction
as exists on scientific spacecraft. However, because of the pos-
sibility of spacecraft anomalies requiring the reduction of such
a large volume of data that hand reduction from analog records
would be unwieldy, the NASA Project Office arranged for accom-
plishment of this operation at the JHU/APL as an add-on to the
consultant services already discussed. As expected, the facility
has been used in studies related to the main power system anomaly
(see Paragraph 3.3).
2.3 MISSION OPERATIONS
Many of the mission operations implemented for GEOS-II are
very similar to those accomplished within the rOCC for GEOS-I.
These are as follows:
• MVE Operations
• GRARR Operations
• SECOR Operations
• Doppler Operations
• Laser Operations.
Because of the additional payloads on GEOS-II, a GSFC re-
quirement for enhanced STADAN timing and the continuation of the
requirement for system intercomparison studies, the following
additional operations were required:
it
•
•
•
•
•
C-Band Operations
Wallops Island Collocation Experiment (WILE)
Operations
Laser Detector Operations
SSED Operations
Network Timing Operations.
The following paragraphs describe the activities inve)ived
in these operations.
2.3.1 MVES Operations
The Mutual Visibility Event Schedule (MVES) Cperati r rns hrnvr
scheduled coordinated observations for approximately 5,000 seven
flash sequences since launch by the GSFC Minitrack Ontic•al Track-
ing System (MOTS) , GSFC Special Optical Tracking System (SPEGFT) ,
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO), United States Coast
and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS), U.S. Air Force and international
optical participants.
As was the case for GEOS-I, the key element in this opera-
tion is the Mutual Visibility Program (MVP), which selects the
optical events to be observed and produces corresponding predic-
tions that are forwarded by the GOCC to the applicable stations.
i
	 The MVP is run for the GOCC by the GSFC Mission and Trajectory
Analysis Division.
A significant change in the GEOS-II operation in this area
was the organization of the data flow to allow the participants
to select (if desired) specific events from the long range MVE.S.
The sequence of events leading to the production of an operational
optical, schedule, provides the investigator with a listing of the
potential events far enough in advance so that if a specific
event or events is desired, enough time remains to coordinate a
request through the GOCC to effect the scheduling of that event
for the operational period.
The GOCC provides predictions to the optical participants
as follows:
Network
GSFC MOTS
GSFC SPEOPT
Air Force
Approximate
Number of
Instruments
12
MVE
Long
Range
Plate
Reducti ;mOperational
y
	10
	 J
	8
	 J
IL
P -i2
	 1
t
Network
SAO
USC&GS
International
Approximate
Number of
Instruments
19
14
10
I	 ^	
f
i
ii
MVE
Long Plate
Operational Range Reductiun
11 ^ 11
y
In addition to the MVE distribution to he ;optical partici-
pants, the C-Band and SECOR networks are also provided the opera-
tional and long range MVE schedule for schedule coordination pur-
pose.s.
2.3.2 GRARR Operations
The GRARR operations remain essentially the same as those
performed for GEOS-I. The GRARR tracks are scheduled by the GJCC
to complement the schedules of the MVE program within the limita-
tion of the GRARR portion of the transponder power budget.
Through the period of this report, about seventy-five hours
of GRARR interrogations have been scheduled.
2.3.3 SECOR Operations
The Army Map Service (AMS) SECOR operation is also essen-
tially the same as that performed for GEOS-I. As dictated by the
time-oriented sequence of events for SECOR participation, the AMS
.requests specific interrogation times. If these requests are
within the allocated power budget, the requests are approved by
the GOCC.
Through the period of this report, about twenty hours of
SECOR interrogations have been scheduled.
2.3.4 Doppler Operations
Doppler data are acquired by the Navy Tracking Network
according to their existing priorities. Through the period of
this report, approximately 14,000 dopp ler data sets have been
recorded.
J' ^
A significant accomplishment of the GEOS-II mission has
2
-13
m
•a3aa:>;:,^`W 
been the provision of approximately 150 days of doppl.er data
yielding precision spacecraft positioning results.
2.3.5 Laser Operations
Significant Laser operation; have been purf .rrn ^i In-
tion with the Wallops Island Collocation Experiment (WICE), using
the GSFC Optical. Systems Branch pulsed ruby-laser system. During
the data acquisition phase of the WICE (.h April 1968 to 28 June
1968), about thirty-two laser tracks were recorded simultaneously
with other system data.
The GSFC laser operations are predominantly conducted during
ground station darkness periods when the spacecraft is illumi-
nated by the sun for all or a portion of the pass. These condi-
tions are necessary, as the most reliabile acquisition mode used
to date has been telescope optical sighting of the spacecraft.
Generally, once the spacecraft is optically acquired and an epoch
adjustment to the prediction drive tape is introduced, correct
laser pointing can be sustained.
2.3.6 C -Band Operations
Since the C -Band instrumentation was new on GEOS -II, it was
recommended by the NASA Rroject Office that the operational cvn-
trol of the C-Band tracking effort be placed in the GOCC. Th3 s r
recommendation was accepted.
The primary purpose of the GEOS-II C-Band effort is to sup -
-port•  the calibration of certain ground -based C -Band radars to
evaluate their accuracy for use as geodetic instrumentation sys-
tems Through the period of this report, over fifty-five hours
of radar ranging data have been scheduled in support of this
effort.
The overall C-Band tracking effort is coordinated by the
Band Project Manager at NASA Wallops Island, Virginia. The C
Band participants include the following agencies;
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• NASA Wallops
0 NASA/GSFC (Manned Space Network)
• NASA/FRC (Flight Research Center)
• Air Force Eastern Test Range
• Air Force Western Test Range
• Edwards Air Force Base
• Pacific Missile Range
• White Sands Missile Range.
Using Mutual Visibility C-Fand Station Prrdictiuns (MUSTY_P)
and the long range Mutual Visibility Event Predictions (both
provided in advance by the GOCC) , each particir ant subinit;s a
tracking request to Wallops delineating specific tracking times
desired. These requests are coordinated by Wallops and submitted
to the GOCC as a composite request. If within the all w9J)le
power budget, the GOCC approves the request,, arranges for the
appropriate command support and optical support, if requested,
and provides operational predictions to the participants.
2.3.7 Wallops Island Collocation Experiment Operations
A majority of the C-Band interrogations to date have been
performed at Wallops Island using the FPQ -6 and FPS-16 C-Band
systems. These data will be used for calibration purposes and
also to support the Wallops Island Collocation Experiment (WILE).
The WICE data acquisition phase began on 1 April 1968 and con-
tinued through 28 June 1968. It is managed by the GEOS-II
principal investigator for system intercompari son at GSFC. The
Wallops Island collocated systems include the following:
• C -Band Radars ( Fp s -16 and - FPQ -6 )
• SECOR
• GSFC Pulsed Laser
• TRANET Doppler
^.
• Two BC -4 Cameras
• Pth-100 Camera.
The WICE provides excellent conditions for performing inter-
'	 comparison studies because of the known locat:.on of th% part.'.ci-
pating instrumentation and the relative ease of data 2%- ,rdim%tion .
The intercomparison studies are being performed in three
general modes:
a. Collocation mode: comparison of data from collocated
systems (one to the other) on arcs over the collocation area
only.
z
b. Short arc mode: comparison of each collocated system
to an Eastern United States short arc derived from optical data.
c. Long arc mode: comparison of each collocated system
to a long arc (one revolution or more) derived from all partci-
pating systems.
2.3.8 Laser Detector operations
With the introduction of the OW laser detector experiment
on GEOS-II, requirements exist for real-time telemetry data
acquisition during the laser detector operational passes and
operational control of the activities. The project recommended
that the operational control be placed with the GOCC. Because
of the complications that could be present in scheduling real-
W time data from a remote STADAN site, and because of the relative
s
ease in establishing a GEOS telemetry reception station, the
project recommended that a simplified telemetry station be
established at the GSFC-CW laser site. Both of these recommen-
dations were accepted.
This experiment is being managed and performed by the GSFC
Optical Systems Branch under the operational control of the GCCC .
The GOCC provides the required command and telemetry support
through STADAN facilities,
The purpose of this experiment is to study the effects of
E
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the atmosphere on the CW laser beam. To date, sufficient data
have been acquired to allow preliminary conclusions in this area.
A report, being prepared by the GSFC Optical Systems Branch, will
discuss these results.
2.3.9 Solar
 Science Electron Detector (SSED) Operations
This experiment is being managed and performed by the JHU/
APL under the operational control of the GOCC. The objective of
the experiment is to investigate the relationship between precipi -
tating electrons and magnetic disturbances in the auroral oval.
Because the electron detector appears to be malfunctioning (see
Paragraph 3.15), only magnetic field data have been acquired to
date.
2.3.10 Network Timing Operations
Because of the timing signal available at 136 MHz from the
GEOS-II spacecraft and the project requirement to control and
determine the GEOS-II timing error relative to UTC, an option
was proposed to GSFC by the NASA Project Office to utilize this
data base to enhance and synchronize the STADAN station clocks
as follows
• Install GEOS time recovery units at all
STADAN stations
• Establish procedures within GSFC to time
synchronize the STADAN utilizing the GEOS
timing station and existing GEES clock
capabilities.
This option was accepted and implemented as follows
Initially, the cperat-i on would consist of collecting time com-
parison data at the participating STADAN stations (GEOS time
with respect to station time) in order to perform analyses of
these data to determine station time with respect to UTC. If
these analyses yielded repetitive and precise results over _a
given period (approximately one to three months), further deci-
sions would then be made to consider implementing a STADAN time
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synchronization program using the GEOS-I1 spacecraft.
The initial phase of this operation did prove successful,
and in May 1968, the Winkf eld, England, and Fairbanks, Alaska,
STADAN stations were directed by the GSFC Network Taming Section
to adjust their station clock time. The adjustments were calcu-
lated by comparison of the respective station time relative to
GEOS time. In June 1968, six additional STADAN stations were
directed to adjust to a new-epoch as dictated by the GEOS com-
parisons. In September 1968, it is anticipated that one addi-
tional station, Lima, Peru, will join the program.
The significance of this program is best described by the
following listing of the initial clock adjustments required at
the various stations:
Station
Fair banks , Alaska,
Carnarvon, Australia
Johannesburg, South Africa
Tananarive, Malagasy Republic
Orroral, Australia
Quito, Ecuador
Santiago, Chile
Adjustment
460 µsec advance
200 µsec retard
500 µsec retard
1300 µsec retard
1650 µsec advance
No adjustment
900 µsec advance
winkfield, England
	
750 µsec retard.
I!
	
	 The Quito, Ecuador, STADAN station clock did not require
an adjustment, as that station had previously been synchronized
to a portable atomic standard carried to the station by GSFC
personnel.
It is apparent at this time that the GEOS technique has
enhanced the STADAN station timing accuracy by an order of
i
	
magnitude, at least
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SECTION 3
SPACECRAFT STATUS
3.1 GENERAL
The GEOS-B spacecraft was launched on 11 January 1968 at
1616:00:0062 from Satellite Launch Complex 2 at the Western Test
Range (WTR) l . The Improved Thrust Augmented Delta Vehicle (Delta
34	 56) using an FW-4D Third Stage provided a nominal orbit as
follows:
Parameter Expected Actual
Apogee (kilometers) 1572.8 1574.5
,t	
Perigee	 (kilometers) 1100.0 1079.5
^f
Inclination (degrees) 105.977 105,8
Period (minutes) 112.392 112.18
Eccentricity	 0.0306	 0.0321
Upon achieving orbit, GEOS-B was designated GEOS-II (1968-
02A).
The following paragraphs describe the status and problems
encountered with the onboard systems. Table 3-1 is a listing by
system of the anomalies encountered since launr;h. The last two
columns show the paragraph and page in this report where the
problem is discussed.
1For more details concerning the launch phase, refer to:
a. NASA, John F. Kennedy Space Center, GEOS-B/DELTA-56
1	 Final Flight Report, now 84, 30 April 1968.
b. Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Flight Re D ort for Delta
Vehicle SIN 20214 1 Delta Program Mission Number 5 Spacecraft.,
GEOS-B, DAC 58711,  Apr 1 1
c. Communications & Systems, Incorporated, GEOS-B Launch_
Evaluation Report, Report Number R- 4035 -40-2, February 196d.
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3.`' ATTITUDE CONTROL AND DETECTION SYSTEMS
Data obtained immediately after launch showed a spin rate
of 4.3 rpm. Because this was higher than the expected 3 rpm spin
rate, the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) advised that the
p l•?.nned initial boom extension (to about three feet) and the sub-
se °uent ;cavity gradient capture would be delayed until th y. spin
rate was significantly lower.
Telemetry data taken on 12 and 13 January showed a steady
increase in the three spacecraft battery temperatures. This was
attributed to an undesirable satellite /sun attitude (with the
spacecraft in 100% sunlight) . The main battery temperature in-
creased to 125 0F and the transponder and optical batteries to
about 112 0E by 11202 on 13 January. All manual and automatic
power dumps and main systems were commanded on in an attempt to
lower the battery temperatures, however, the temperatures re-
mained too high. APL decided that extending the gravity gradient
boom would change the attitude significantly and reduce the tem-
peratures to safer levels. Therefore, at 2350Z on 13 January,
commands were sent from the Howard County station to uncage the
end mass and extend the boom about three feet. The spin rate at
that time was approximately 2.1 rpm. This maneuver resulted in
the temperatures rap idly decreasing to a level within the nominal:
limits (all below 1000F) .
With the eddy current damper released from the magnetic
influences of the spacecraft, it functioned to rapidly reduce
the remaining spin. At 0140Z, 14 January, the electromagnet was
turned on by APL to allow alignment of the spacecraft spin axis
with the earth's magnetic field. By 140OZ on 14 January, the
spin rate had decreased to virtually zero and magnetic stabili-
zation was established. At 1350Z, 15 January, the boom was ex
c,ended, by command from the Howard County station, to 29 feet
11 inches and gravity gradient stabilization was established in
the right side up mode. A graphic illustration of the spin rate
versus time is shown in Figure 3"-1 with the significant events
as discussed above annotated.
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Throughout the period covered by this report, all elements
of the attitude control and measurement systems have operated as
expected. The initial attitude determination performed by APL
from data obtained from 22 through 26 January showed a maximum
deviation from the no;,mal of 4.70 , with excursions of less than
30
 being typical. Additional attitude determinations computed
from data recorded in February, March and May yield generally
the same results.
3.3 POWER AND SOLAR ARRAY MONITOR (SAM) SYSTEMS
Prior to launch it had been noted by APL that a deteriora-
tion of the solar cell silicon monoxide coating had taken place
during storage of the solar panels. Therefore, it was estimated
that a 2 to 4% degradation in solar current would occur in orbit.
Initially, an approximate 5% degradation from the design output
was seen on all three power systems, a decrease in reasonable
agreement with that expected.
The optical and transponder power systems have continued to
operate as expected through this report period. Battery tempera-
tures and voltages have been maintained well within limits. A
comparison of the SAM readings with the expected (design less 5%)
has been in very close agreement.
The main power system has not operated as well as expected.
Wi
The departure from the expected nominal was first detected on
22 February 1968 and characterized by distinct drops in the cur-
rent being supplied by the main solar array.
	
Because of these
current drops, the integrated current being; supplied the main
-., system, as detected by the main SAM, has shown a decrease from
the expected of about 17%.	 This decreased output has continued
through the period covered by this report.
Tnvestigations into the problem by APL have shown the cur-
rent drops to be in two general categories; drops from the ex-
pected nominal of 400 milliamps and 800 mihiamps .	 Because the
800 milliamp value is larger than the current that can be supplied'
by one solar panel, it is probable that these drops (observed as
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two 400 milliamp drops or, possibly because of the forty-eight
second cycle time of the commutator, as one 800 milliamp drop)
involve two panels. Also, because forty-five of the fifty drops
investigated were at a sun angle with respect to the boom axis
of go o or greater, indicating near normal sun incidence on the
equatorial panels, the APL concludes that the equatorial panels
are probably causing the problem.
Because the problem did not occur when GEOS was in a 100%
sunlight orbit (through 18 February), and all drops invest.'..gated
to date have occurred within five to twenty-six minutes after
spacecraft entrance from shadow to sunlight, APL conclusions to
date state that the problem is probably caused by open circuits
on the equatorial panels which are temperature induced. Attempted
correlation of the problem to the operational mode of the space-
craft (i.e., other system usage, flashing lights, et cetera) have
produced negative results, that is, no correlation exists.
Because of this problem, as the spacecraft approached mini-
mum sunlight conditions in June, main power had to be conserved
by periodic turn-offs of the telemetry and 1j2-MHz and 324-MHz
doppler beacons. It is expected that power conservation will be
required until the spacecraft approaches 85% sunlit orbits some-
time in late December 1968,
3.4 TELEMETRY SYSTEM
With only three exceptions, all channels of the 162-
channel telemetry system have operated as planned. The modulated
RF output has proven to be quite adequate for data transmission
and for interferometer tracking purposes. A description of the
characteristics of the three exceptions is given below:
a. When memory converter number two is in use, there is no
indication of memory converter (number two) input current on Com-
mutator 1, Channel 20. This deficiency was noted prior to launch.
b. During the initial check-out phase, it was noted by APL
that, on two occasions, the subcommutators on Channel 18 of each
of the commutators stepped incorrectly. The subcommutators
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stepped correctly from Channel 8 through Channel 3 but then, in-
stead of stepping to Channel 4, skipped to Channel 8 and then
properly stepped to Channel 3 where the sequence ended. Improper
stepping of the subcommutators has also been noted during the in-
vestigations associated with the erratic optical beacon operation
discussed in Paragraph 3.7 and were probably caused by noise gener-
ated by the beacons.
c. The calibration of Channel 19 of Commutator Number 1,
the optical battery current function, changed at about the time
the squib was fired to uncage the boom end mass. The telemetered
value for this channel is about 40% lower than expected. Since
the squib is actuated by the optical battery, it is probable that
the optical battery current telemetry resistor was shunted when
the squib fired. This additional parallel resistance caused the
effective resistance of the telemetry resistor to be decreased.
Because of the reduction in resistance, the voltage generated -
for a given current level is lower than expected; therefore, the
telemetered value reads low.
This condition required an in-orbit recalibration of the
optical battery current telemetry function. This was accomplished
by performing optical system manual dump on and off command opera-
tions during a portion of an orbit when the spacecraft was in
darkness. As the load of the dump resistor is known and the ab-
sence of solar current input required that all the current be
supplied by the optical battery, an analysis of the resulting
telemetered values of the optical battery current function
allowed a recalibration of this channel to be accomplished.
3.5 COMMAND SYSTEM
The command system has been operated extensively since
f	
launch. Through 31 July 1968 over 3,600 commands have been
actuated by the spacecraft command system with no recurring prob-
lems encountered. However, some instances of abnormal operations
have been noted. The abnormalities are characterized by addi-
tional commands being actuated during periods when the spacecraft
was being commanded b a GE OS '-II comma	 station.y	 0 
	
n
  d   
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1
t
C
Desired Command
Function (Tones)
Transponder power
dump off (CED)
Abnormality
Number	 Day/Time (UT)
1
	
22/1424
2
	 22/1602	 972-MHz trans-,
mitter on (CCE )
22/160g
	
Range trans-
ponder, off
(CBC)
22/2123	 Commutator No.
1 hold on (DCD)
3
4
Commutator No.
1 hold off (DCB )
Memory No. 2
select (DBB)
6
5 22/2130
23/1242
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The first instances of command abnormalities were observed
on 22 and 23 January 1968, while the spacecraft was undergoing
the initial systems checking phase. The spacecraft was under the
control of APL personnel who reported that the abnormalities were
characterized by an additional command being actuated on board
the spacecraft at or near the time of the actuation of a desired
command. Because of the forty-eight second commutation period of
the telemetry system, it could not be verified whether or not
both the desired and undesired commands were actuated simulta-
neously. However, it was verified that all undesired commands
were actuated within (at most) one telemetry commutation period
of the desired commands. The commands in question are as follows:
ACd tonal Command
Function (Tones)
C -Band transponder
manual interrogate
(CDD)
Range and range
rate transponder
manual interrogate
(CBD)
Optical power dump
switch (CDC)
C -Band transponder
on (EBD)
C-Band transponder
off (EBB)
Memory converter
No. 1 on (BDB)
Although verification of the simultaneity of the desired and
additional commands is impossible, an interesting charge/fire line
relationship exists with the group of six command inconsistencies
as follows:
Abnormality Desired Command Additional Command
Number Charge Fire Charge Fire
1 7 4 7 2
2 5 8 5 2
3 l 6 3 6
4 6 3 6 2
5 2 3 2 2
6 2 1 3 l
( On four occasions, specifically abnormality numbers 1, 2, 4
r and 5, the additional command occurred in fire line number 2 and
the same charge line as the desired command.
	 This is the same
type of problem that caused failure of the command subsystem in
GEOS-A, except that the problem occurred on fire line number. 1 in
that spacecraft. Analysis of the GEOS-A failure indicated that t^
the associated fire line SCR was probably remaining in the
triggered state.
Additional commands on the other two occasions, specifically
numbers
	
n	 6abnormality	
	  3 a d	 occurred in the same fire line as
the desired command, but both occurred in charge line number 3.
This problem could be caused by several marginal conditions, for
example, noise triggering the charge gate transistor control cir-
=k
cuitry or the charge gate transistor remaining on.
The second of the instances of command anomalies was ob-
served on 18 April 1968. 	 The spacecraft was being utilized in
normal operations and the Newfoundland STADAN station was execut-
ing a scheduled. GEOS-.LI command . ass ignment, a cammutd tor stop
operation for magnetometer data acquisiticn. 	 Analysis of the
NEWFLD ` strip chart recorded during this pass (starting at 0052Z)
reveals the following:
^w
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Tm
YTime
005900
X005930
X005950
,-010040
010308
010341
010800
Command Transmitted
lla (DCD) - Comm 1
hold on (Ch 71)
11a (DCD) - Comm 1
hold on
llb (DCB) - Comm 1
run
11a (DCD) - Comm 1
hold on (Ch 71)
None
None
llb (DCB) - Comm 1
run
t
Command Executed
	
Comments
Same	 Wrong channel
stopped on 72
S/C already in
lla configura-
tion
Same
Same	 OK - stopped
on Ch 71
lab (DBB) - Mem-
ory Number 2 on
13a (DBD) - Mem-
ory Number 1 on
Same
Unlike the command abnormalities of 22 and 23 January 1968,
the two abnormalities during the 0103 minute above can be veri-
fied as not having occurred simultaneously with another command.
This verification was possible as NEWFLD was recording both com-
mutator data and its command times during the pass. The nature
of the extraneous functions allowed determination of the exact
time of their execution as the switching of memories caused a
memory read-out to be telemetered on Commutator Number 2 (5.4
kHz VCO) and these times were well separated from the NEWFLD
commands. 1
 The command problems of 22 and 23 January could be,
as explained, attributed to spacecraft command system malfunc-
tions ) However, this does not rule out the possibility of some
other station inadvertently commanding the spacecraft. The com-
mand problems of 18 April suggest more strongly that this io-
actually the case
Another command problem was experienced on l June 1968. The
ROSMAN station was unable to command the spacecraft to the memory
1The problems that were caused by this command abnormality
are explained under the memory paragraph of this section.
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load mode. However, subsequent evaluation of the ROSI N AN strip
chart showed a strong Interfering signal present at the time cif
the scheduled command, which blocked the command receiver from
accenting the ROSMAN command. The source of the interference
has yet to be determined.
A few other command irregularities have belen noted; however,
many of these have been traced to ground static 	 The
remainder are characterized by an unexplained inability of an
apparent properly operating ground station to command the space-
craft. This group of inconsistencies has bad negligibLa effect
on the operation as additional command attempts., very near in
time to the initial attempt., have proven successful.
3.6 MEMORY AND CLOCK SYSTEM
The performance of this system has been sufficient to fully
support GEOS-II operations; how-ever, a memory number two failure
in the redundant memory system has caused the loss of memory
backup capability. In addition, oscillator number one has demon-
strated erratic operation causing it to be replaced by oscillator
number two.
The following subparagraphs more fully delineate the prob-C)
lems encountered with the memory and clock system.
3.6.1 Memory Number Two
Since launch., successful operation of memory number two has
not been possible. During the system checking phase ., APL re-
peatedly attempted to load memory number two with negative re-
sults. During all instances of attempted operation,, it appeared
to be in a steady dumping mode and would not cycle through the
four load conditions or accept a memory load message.
Although it is possible that the cause of this failure is
organic to the memory itself, there is a possibility that the
relay in the power switchinp ,,
 matrix which switches the 
-32 volts
between memory one and two is not making contact in the memory
two position. APL has duplicated the characteristics of the
3-11
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failure by removing the 
-32 volts from a GIE,00 memory durintr, bench
experiments.
3.6.2 Memory Number One
Memory number one 1,ias completely	 UEC&C-110:
related operations since launch. Through about the rnl ,tIc"Uo , f 114'ay
1968, only a few isolated memory anomalivo- Occurred. ThosE
anomalies are explained below.
In mid-May, spacecraft timing began to experience anomalc us
drift rates and on approximately 1 June 1968 erratic ^ptical bea-
con operations became apparent. Subsequent invostigations into
these problems uncovered a malfunctioning option-1 beac,, n assembly.
While the malfunctioning beacon caused many memory disruptions
and the anomalous drift rates seen are surely rs' lated to the mem-
ory, these problems will be discussed under the optical beacon
portion of this document (Paragraph 3-7).
Memory one anomalies noted during the APL system checking
phase are as follows:
a. During one load period, Word 1 1 the flash inhibit word,
was spuriously updated 'by two binary counts causing the inhibit
signal to occur two minutes early. This anomaly is attributed
to noise with the probable source being the flash tubes.
b. During one load period, Word 9 ,,, Bit 15 changed from a
programmed data 0 to data 1, causing lamp number three to be in-
cluded in the flash sequence dictated by Word 9. It is also
probable that this problem was caused by noise generated by the
flash tubes.. Word 9 1 Bit 15 is coincident with the third flash
of a given sequence.
After the spacecraft was declared operational ., the following
anomalies were noted:
3.6.2.1 Memory Number One Memory Address Anomaly
on 23 March 1968, during the 01562 minute, a one bit (—,44
msec) jump in timing was observed at the APL Howard County station
3-12
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via their time recovery unit. During this pass over the United
States, a law-er detector operation was scheduled which requires
a turn-on of the detector (which also oauses a vurn -on
 of the
SSED) and commutator step and start operations. These commands
(14a, b and 12a, b) w ere executed by the ROSMAN sta t ion . An
analysis of the ROSMAN command record revealed that only two com-
mands ,,ere sent during the period 0156-01572, 23 March, these
being a Commutator 2 .,stop and start command. It is very unlikely
that these commands had anything to do with the timing jump.
Another possible, but very unlikely, cause for the timing jump
could have been SEED generated noise interference, as this system
was not commanded off until 015930Z. However, the most likely
cause of this problem is flash tube generated noise interference
to the memory system, as a flash sequence was initiated at the
0156Z minute mark. The flash tubes included in this sequence
were numbers 2, 3 and 4. Noise probably interfered with one of
the 22.75-Hz memory scan signals, causing the memory to miss one
n
`	 memory address and, therefore, caused the corresponding time lag
ti
of app,noximately 44 msec.
This memory anomaly caused a 44-msec timing error to be
present until the next injection at 15252, 23 March. However,
r
	
	
the timing problem was not known by the ROSMAN injection station
personnel. They proceeded with a scheduled normal mode injection,
causing the memory load to be translated by one bit (i.e., Word
1, Bit 1 data stored in Word 65, Bit 21, et cetera). Thi s im-
r
	 proper memory load invalidated the scheduled flashes and time
normalization until, the next ROSMAN injection (clock resynchroni-
1
	 zation mode) on 24 March at 1544Z.
}
3. 6.2. 2 Memory Number One Faxed Marker Anomaly
The first indication of this anomaly was also evidenced by
a- timing inconsistency. Figure 3 -2 is a graphic representation
r	 of this timing inconsistency. Sometime after 090OZ, 3 April
f	 1968, the spacecraft minute mark began to drift rapidly in the
f
	 lagging direction with respect to UTC. This occurrence was
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detected by five stations (Orroral, Australia; Santiago, Chile;
Carna.rvon, Australia; Rosman, North Carolina; and APL, Howard
County). The magnitude of the drift was about 20 µsec/minute in
the direction having the effect of lengthening the spacecraft
minute. At the time of the scheduled resync injection (scheduled
not for this problem but because time monitoring had shown the
spacecraft to be out of the ± 400 µsec tolerance with respect to
UTC) at ROSMAN, the spacecraft minute mark was lagging UTC by
^i
	
about 4.38 msec. APL was also monitoring time at the resync and
confirmed this reading.
After the resync injection at 15172, 3 April, the drift ter-
minated. This would lead one to believe that possibly two addi-
f`
	
tional normal deletes (which would yield a drift rate of 19.6
µsec/minute) were incorrectly stored in the flash time words to
cause this problem. This is not to say that the deletes were in-
correctly injected because then the drift would have been seen
from injection to injection (14572, 2 April, to 1516Z, 3 April);
this was not the case.
After receipt of the 3 April injection record (GEMTU print-
out) from the ROSMAN station, it was established that errors
existed in that day's preload readout. Specifically, errors
were indicated in three words of the preload, they being Words
24, 25 and 61. In order to describe the cause of this anomaly,
it is necessary tc analyze, in detail, each of these words show-
ing its relationship to the anomalous spacecraft operation.
Word 61 is the flash count accumulator word. The first nine
bits of this word store in binary count the number of flashes
executed since the last injection without regard, however, for
the number of flash assemblies used to produce any given flash.
The flash count was low by twenty-one counts„ From previous ex-
perience with GEOS-II, noted before launch, it is known that the
flash detector associated with flash assembly number three is
defective and, therefore, any flash sequence incorporating
assembly number three alone will not increment the flash count
3 -15
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accumulator word. 	 Over the period in question ., 2 April/1457Z to
3 April 151.52 there were a total of four seven-flash sequences
using only assembly number three.
	 Therefore, the accumulator
should have recorded twenty-eight flashes less than that pro-
grammed.	 Since the accumulator recorded only twenty-one flashes
less, it is probable that an additional unprogrammed seven-flash
sequence was executed during the period in question.
	 it
i
Words 24 and 25 are flash time words.
	 The first twelve bits
are incremented one binary count each minute and store a binary
representation of the number of minutes after injection (To ) that
a flash sequence will occur.
	 When the first twelve bits of any
flash time word are read out of memory as all data 1 1 s, then cir-
cuitry is set to execute a flash sequence on the next minute
mark.	 Bits 13 through 15 select the flash assemblies to be in-
corporated in the sequence and Bit 17 determines the length of
the sequence.
	 Bits 18 through 21 command deletes at the normal
(9.8 psec/delete) rate in the clock divider.
	 Each data one in
Bits 18 through 21 command one normal delete each minute and
therefore have the effect of lengthening the interval between
spacecraft minute marks by 9.8 4sec/minute.
The predicted and actual binary representation of Words 24
and 25 during the preload readout on 3 April is as follows:
Word 24
Predicted	 ill ill 010 100 10.1 ill 010
Actual	 ill ill 010 100 101 ill ill
Word 25
Predicted	 101 ill 010 100 010 Oil 010
rr Actual	 110 101 001 000 010 Oil 010
Bits 18 through 21 of Word
	 actually 1111 instea,d of
the correct 1010.	 Therefore -,	 "'or-	 normal deletes are pres-
ent which would cause a
	 the minute mark interval
by 2x9.8 4sec/minute
	 19.6 paec	 ./minute	 Thus .  a causal
3-16 is
w,
relationship with the drifting minute mark seen between approxi-
mately 1000/3 April. and 15162, the injection time on 3 April, is
^_ stabl.ished .
The predicted count of word 25, first twelve bits, was 701.
This means that 701 minutes (11 hours 41 minutes) prior to Toil
time on 3 April (15172) a flash was scheduled to occur by Word
25 (1517Z - 11 hours 41 minutes = 0336Z) . This is verified by
the 2 April injection. A seven-flash, lamp number two sequence
was scheduled for 03362, 3 April 1968 and was programmed in Word
25. However, Word 25 did not read the predicted value; rather,
it read 299. This indicates that 299 minutes (4 hours 59 minutes)
prior to 1517Z/3 April (1517Z - 4 hours 59 minutes 101 82) a
flash was executed by Word 25. This assumption ties directly
into the extra seven counts in the flash accumulator word (Word
61). Word 25 actually caused two seven-flash, 'lamp number two
sequences on 3 April 1968. This first sequence was executed as
programmed at 03362. Word 25 then proceeded to increment one
binary count each minute until 1016Z when it was incorrectly re-
stored to memory as all data 1 1 s. During the 1017Z minute, Word
25 was read out as all data 1's and therefore caused a flash
segaence to begin on the spacecraft minute mark at 1018Z.
In accounting for all the words in error during the preload
minute on 3 April 1968, another interesting relationship exists.
Words 24 and 25 caused two seemingly unrelated effects to satel-
lite operation during the period in question. The former caused
the approximate 20 µsec/minute timing drift of the spacecraft
minute mark and the latter caused an extra flash sequence to
occur. Analyzing these effects in relationship to data presented
in Figure 3-2 one can see that the extra flash sequence occurred
very close in time to the probable start of the spacecraft minute
mark drift as determined from time recovery data taken on 3 April
1968. 
It is probable that the cause (as established above) of
these two errors occurred during the same time interval, namely,
3 -17
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during; the data handling of Words 24 and 25 between 10162 and
10172, 3 April 1968. Specifically, the anomaly occurred at Ward
24, Bit 16, which effected memory data from that point through
Word 25, Bit 12.
As the data handling circuitry serially operated on Word 24
and Word 25 during the 1016 minute, it is probable that the
following occurred:
Read cycle
Word 24
010 010 Oil 000 101 111 010
110 010 O11 000 101 111 010
110 010 011 000 1011111 111
Word 2,5
000 010 011 000 010 011 010
Read cycle
Should have restored as
Restored as
Should have restored as 	 100 010 Oil 000 010 Oil 010
i	 Restored as	 111 111 111 111 010 Olt 010
.E
As was stated above, the addition of two extra normal delete
bits in Word 24 caused the minute mark drift and, during minute
10172, Word 25 was read as all data is causing the extra, seven-
flash sequence to occur at 10182, 3 April.
The error was introduced by the restoring of the data is
shown in the boxed area above. Since Bits 16 through 18 of Word
24 were already data 1's, it cannot be clearly seen that Bit 16
.of Word 24 was the first bit involved in the anomaly. However,
through analysis of the data handling of all memory words, a
.. m
	
	 clear correlation can be constructed. This correlation appears
in Words 63 and 64, the satellite inserted marker words (fixed
marker).
The bit scheme for these words is generated internally in
she data handling circuitry and is as follows:
Word 63	 Word 64
000 000 000 000 x;00 lil 111
	
111 111 111 ill 000 000 000
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Thus, the boxed-in data I t s above clearly correlate  t o the
incorrectly restored data i t s discussed in Words 24 and 25.
The mechanism for generating the data 1's in Words 63 and
64 is explained with reference to Figure 3-3 (Data Handling,
Logic Diagram extracted from JHU/APL TG-896 1
 April 1967). At
memory position 18X, 16Y (coincident with Word 63 Bit 16), the
following occurs:
A44 output goes high, setting F10
Output of lower gate of F10 goes high
• A45 output goes low
• A58 output goes high
a
• A53 output goes low ( logic level 1) .
Logic level 1's are restored to memory from this point (Word
6 Bit 16 until the next memos position 13>	 >	 y	 Y. For the fixedp	 3
marker, this condition is satisfied coincident with Word 64, Bit
13 1
 F10 is reset, the output of A53 goes high (logic level 0),
and data O's are restored to memory.
Relating the above logic to the anomaly of Words 24 and 25,
one can see that with the exception of the 18X condition, allet
a
other conditions are present to generate the fixed marker on any
given adjacent words. That is, 16Y occurs at Bit 16 of all words
and 13Y occurs at Bit 13 of all words. The unique condition
associated with the fixed marker is the occurrence of 16Y and
18X simultaneously. This condition is satisfied only at Word
63, Bit 16. Word 24, Bit 16 is coincident with memory position
16Y, 44X. Position 44X is far removed from 18X; however, it is
probablethat the 18X condition was satisfied during Word 24,
Bit 16 causing the error as previously discussed.
At the time of the memory anomaly, no spacecraft operations
were being conducted. All transponders were off battery with
the exception of SECOR which was in the standby mode. No c.om-
mands were being executed and no flash sequences were in progress
162-MHz and 324-MH2- doppler beacons were on with 972 MHz off.
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SSED and Laser Detector were off and no passive operations were
in progress. The telemetry transmitter and functions were on,
however, no station was recording telemetry data as the 4atel-
lite was at 350
 West Longitude and 60 0
 South Latitude and not
in sight of any STADAN station
As the effects of this anomaly were corrected by a resyn-
chronous mode injection at 15172, 3 April, the effect on the
overall operation (rapid time drift) was restricted to about a
five-hour period.
3.6.2.3 Memory Number One Command Disruption
Data obtained on 18 April 1968 seemed to indicate the
occurrence of another memory anomaly. However, when all data
were collected, the probable cause was attributed to command
problems either internal or external to the spacecraft (see
Paragraph 3.5).
The first indication of the malfunction was observed by
APL time monitoring via doppler beacons. This assessment indi-
cated that during the period 0103Z to 0104Z, 18 April, the space-
craft minute mark assumed a new epoch (approximately thirty-
bi	 three seconds lagging UTC) and began drifting toward the leading
side of UTC at a rate of abou' 1 cosec/minute. This assessment
was not verified by GSFC time monitoring, as no time monitor
data were obtained after 1752Z, 17 April, through 16292, 18
April.
At ingestion time on 18 April (T o = 1624Z) the ROSMAN GEMTU
j	 preload readout did verify a memory disruption. This injection
record showed that beginning with Word 11, all :'formalization
bits were data zero. This condition caused a drift rate due to
the lack of ninety-eight normal deletes, the magnitude being 98
x 9.8 µsec/delete	 960 µsec/minute, thus verifying the APL
assessment with respect to magnitude. In examining the flash
time words in error (Words 12 1ahrough 59) it was possible to
count back to the time when these words were read from memory
as all data zeros. This time corresponded to 0104Z. thus
3-21
confirmino the AFL assessment with respect to time.
	
The malfunc-
tion occurred during the data handling of Word 11 of the 01037
minute, 18 April, causing all bits thereafter to be restored to
memory as data zeros.
Uoon examining a strip chart recorded by the Newfoundland
STADAN station during this period,	 (refer to Paragraph 3.5). the
causes of this memory interruption were explained.	 The strip
chart indicated that at approximately 010308Z the spacecraft
switched from memory number one (the one in operation) to memory
number two.	 Thirty-three seconds later, approximately 0103412.
a switch back to memory number one occurred.	 This, then, ex-
plains the thirty-three second jump in the spacecraft minute mark,
as memory number one was cycled out of operation for that period.
Since switching of memories causes the data handling circuitry
to switch to the memory load portion of the load cycle, the re-
storing of data zeros after Word Us Bit 12 and the corresponding
approximate 1 msec/minute clock drift (fast) are explained.
aI
J
Since there were no ground data inputs to memory at the time of
the undesired load, itj is proper for the memory to restore all
data zeros.
3.6.3	 Oscillator Number One
Figures 3-4 through 3-7 are plots of the 5-MHz oscillator
number one frequency deviation from launch through 16 April 1968,
the day this oscillator was switched out of operation.
	
The data
were obtained from reports submitted to the GOCC by APL and are IJ
derived from Navy Doppler tracking data.
By 20 February 1968, 'the day mission operations wereiniti-
"ji
aced, oscillator number one had stabilized to a drift rate of
10
about 1.5 parts in 10	 per day.	 If reasonably predictab!e,
this drift rate would have been completely satisfactory to sus-
tain operations.	 However, on 21 February 1968, the frequency
changed, either instantaneously or at a very rapid rate, by
approximately sixteen parts in 10 10 .	 As can beseen in F4gures_
3-4 through 3-7, its drift then became erratic and difficult to
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predict. on 31 March, another frequency shift appeared with mag-
nitude of approximately twelve parts in 10 10
 within one day. On
10 April, on advice from the Technical Advisory Group it was de-
cided to swl'- n h to oscillator number two, and on 16 April 1968,
the switch was accomplished.
The cause of the frequency shifts and erratic drift of oo-
cillator number one is unknown. The erratic behavior began about
two days after the orbit of the spacecraft entered partial dark-
ness suggesting that oscillator number one is extremely tempera-
ture sensitive, that is, sensitive to the allowable fluctuations
of the oven. It is apparent that the oven was not at fault, as
the same oven (number %­ .ne) is being used with oscillator number
two and similar behavior has not been noted.
3.6.4 O Q cillator Number Two
Figures 3-8 and 3-9 are plots of the 5-MH,-, oscillator two
frequency deviation from 16 April 1.968 through 31 May 1968.
Again, the data were obtained from reports submitted to the GOCC
by APL and are derived from Navy Doppler tracking data.
Oscillator number two has performed very well with a smooth
drift rate of about one part in 10 10 per day.	 From the day it
was put into operation, through the end of this reporting period,
frequency predictions for normalization purposes have been more
accurately obtained.	 The drift rate during June and July is
typical of that presented in Figures 3-8 and 3-9.
3.7	 OPTICAL BEACON SYSTEM
From launch through approximately the middle of May 1968,
only two minor anomalies were detected in the optical beacon sys-
tem, as follows:
a.	 Assembly Number Three Flash Count
The flash detector of assembly number three has insufficient
sensitivity and, therefore ., will not increment the flash count
memory word when assembly three is used alone in a sequence.
This problem was noted during the assembly vibration tests.
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During these tests., the output of assembly number three dropped
to 20% of the design value. The problem was assessed as having
very small impact; therefore, in view of the tight schedule, it
wao not rectified. Close inspection of assembly number three
did not uncover the cause of the reduced detector output.
b.	 Assembly Number Two Extra Flash
on many occasions	 assembly number two has flashed e1ght
times when scheduled for the normal seven flashes.	 The extra
flash occurs at the four second clock immediately preceding the
clock on the Integer minute.
	
Although the assembly capacitors
begin to charge at about 4.6 seconds befor p the integer minute,
the tubes are designed to be insensitive to the initia 'l trigger
(four seconds prior, to integer minute) as the voltage across the
tube is relatively low. 	 However, in this case, It is probable
that tube number two is over sensitive and, at times, will dis-
charge at the lower voltage level. 	 This anomaly has been of
negligible consequence.
3.7.1	 Spacecraft Time Anomaly
Beginning in mid-May ., an anomalous time drift was apparent.
Normally, by knowing the spacecraft ultra-stable 5-MHz oscillator
frequency (derived from doppler tracking frequency calculations)
and programming the spacecraft memory to delete cy cles of the
oscillator output, the frequency can be normalized to the rate
-consistent with maintaining the occurrence of the spacecraft
minute mark within ± 400 psec of ground reference time., UTC.
Although it is difficult to program the memory to effect zero
minute mark drift, for a properly operating system the resultant
drift caused by an error in normalization can be easily calcu-
lated.	 Howeverj since mid-May., this has not been the case.
The anomalous drift is in the direction characteristic of
additional, unprogrammed deletes being executed at the delete
circuits.	 The anomalous drift is always to the lagging side of
UTC.	 The actual drift has been, at times, as much as 200 psec
per day positive (spacecraft lagging UTC) when the error in
3-30
normalization should have caused a negative (,spacecraft leading
UTO drift of 150 psec/day (i.e., net anomalous drift of about
350 psec per day positive).
1, '­ ^
Data obtained by the GOCC relative to this problem indicate
that the drift is present during high density optical beacon
activity, Also, tests were conducted to analyze timing data
during twenty-four hour periods when no flashes were programmed.
The spacecraft minute mark drift during these periods was normal,
supporting the theory that the problem is caused by optical bea-
con interferenco to the timing circuits.
During tests conducted to isolate the causes of erratic
optical beacon flashes (discussed in Paragraph 3.7.2) a decision
was made to discontinue the use of optical beacon assembly number
four. Timing data analyzed during the three beacon operation
(commencing 18 July 1968) has shown a significant reduction in
the magnitude of the anomalous drift; however, a small unpre-
dicted drift of about 40 psec per day is still present.
Tests conducted by APL on 31 July and 1 August in connection
with the optical beacon anomalies again demonstrated the influ-
ence of beacon number four on spacecraft timing. During Alter-
nate optical Logic number two tests (beacon assemblies two and
four), the GSFC ROSMAN station was monitoring GEOS-II time
	
on
two separate occasions
., GEOS-II time was seen to slow down (to
move to the lagging side of UTC) an amount characteristic of
one extra normal r1ala4-.a p er AnT. Number twon P I n k	 T4- 4	 n1­%NJ	 0
able that assembly number four was the cause of these errors.
In summary, existing data indicate the following:
a. Timing anomaly is caused by flash induced deletes in
the spacecraft clock divider.
b. Assembly number four flashes either alone and/or in
combination with other assemblies cause major time disturbances.
c. Assemblies one, two and three used alone and/or in com
bination with each other cause minor time disturbances.
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3.7.2 Erratic Flash Anomaly
Beginning about 2 June 1968, reports from the Optical par-
ticipants indicated that the programmed optical beacon flashes
were )
 at times, being executed erratically. The proper execution
of a flash sequence places the first flash on the integer minute
with subsequent flashes occurring on the four second marks. on
numerous occasions, various flaoheo in a programmed sequence were
reported to have occurred about 1.5 seconds prior to the oched-
uied time, either replacing the scheduled flash or occurring in
addition to it. The problem became progressively worse during
June.
on 27 June, during a scheduled lamp number four sequence., a
frequency normalizer inhibit occurred causing timing to drift
rapidly until the next injection. Because the operation was
being seriously hampered by the frequent occurrence of optical
system anomalies, mission operations were suspended on 28 June 	
ti
in order to diagnose the problem.
During the period 28 June through 17 July, a comprehensive
testing program was conducted. The optical assemblies were pro-
grammed singularly and in various combinations for Observation by
selected optical sites and for telemetry observation, via real-
time telemetry facilities, at the GOCC. Real-time Alternate
Optical Logic operations were also accomplished.
The results of the testing program are summavized below-:
Lamp One	
3.
a. Erratic flashing detected only when operated in sequence
along with number four,
b. When operated alone., does not affect timing.
C, Caused normalizer inhibit on 5 July.
d. AOL number one testing normal.
U	 Lamp Two
a. Erratic flashing (weak) on four second clock before
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Minute mark*
b. Erratic flashing (other than a.) only when operated in
-1oequence along with number f oulf
c. When operated alone, does not aff ,'_, ct timing.
Lamn Three
a. No erratic flashes detected,
b. When operated alone., does not affect timing;.
c. AOL number one testing normal..
Lama Four
a. Involved in all erratic flashes detected,
b. Caused normalizer inhibit on 27 June, 8, 14 and 16 July.
c. Caused normalizer and flazh inhibit on 6 July.
d. During AOL number two testing, flashes about every 2.5
seconds without commanding.
In. addition, erratic operation of the telemetry system was
detected during the testing. It is probable that this was in-
duced by in erference I.VU111 the optical
	
system,uem, as all
telemetry anomalous operation occurred while flashes were being
executed in either the AOL or memory controlled mode.
	
The char-
acteristics of the anomalous telemetry operation are summarized
below:
a.	 On occasion, main commutator one skips channels during
memory controlled flash sequences.
J b.	 On occasionj after being stopped on subcommutator, main
commutator one will step from the subcommutator channel to Channel
8 during AOL number two operation.
c.	 AOL number tw-o operation produces assembly two and four
flash about every 2.5 seconds without commanding.
	 Subcommutator
steps on each 2.5 second flash (i.e., without flash clock) and,
at times, steps out of sequence.
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d. During memory controlled sequences incorp,)ratingt assembly
four, subcommutator, at times, steps out of sequence.
e. AOL number one operation produces no telemetry anomalies.
f. Subcommutall-oro step only on four second clock during.
memory controlled sequences, even If ex-roneouo (extra) flashes
are present.
In reviewing the test data., it was obvious that lamp number
four was deeply Involved in the anomalies analyzed. The Techni-
cal Advisory Group (TAG), therefore, recommended that lamp number
four flashes be suspended. Sine the resumption of norm'r,41 opera-
Lions on 18 July 1968, excluding lamp number four,, no anomalous
optical beacon flashes or telemetry malfunctions have been
detected.
A normalizer inhibit condition did occur on 5 August, how-
ever )
 during a seven-flash sequence incorporating assemblies one,
two and three. On 5 July lamp number one was the cause of a nor-
malizer inhibit. These two bits of information., plus the fact
that a small anomalorAs clock drift is present during the three
assembly operation, suggest that a problem may exist in one or
some combination of the remainin g three operational optical
beacons.
3.8 DOPPLER BEACONS
The doppler system is operating well within specification
with doppler clata being obtained from the 162- and 324-MHz bea-
cons on a daily basis. Because of the main system power problem
(Paragraph 3-3) the 972-MHz beacon has only been operated for
about 500 hours since launch, as compared t o 5) 000 hours for the
other two beacons however, no problems have been encountered.
3.9 LASER REFLECTORS
The laser reflectors have been successfully tracked. No
anomalous operations have been reported.
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3.10 LASER DETECTOR
The GSFC Cptical Systems Branch reports the laser detector
to be operating completely as expected. Sufficient data have
been taken to allow analyses and preliminary conclusions in Ois
area.
3.11 C-BAND RADAR TRANSPONDERS
The attached report (Appendix A) was requested of the Wallops
Island C-Band Project Manager for inclusion in this document. It
discusses the C-Band abnormalities detected to date by the NASA
Wallops Station C-Band radars.
In addition to the data contained in the Wallops report, a
problem exists in the telemetry channels associated with trans-
ponder received signal strength.
	 It is the opinion of the Wallops j
Station C-Band Project Manager that the data provided by these
channels are not within the accuracy range required to allow pre-
ci ge determination of the delays associated with the respective
transponders.
	 The design specifications called for telemetry
calibrations ,  which would allow delay determination to ± 10 nano-
seconds.	 As the delay is a function of the received signal
strength at the spacecraft borne transponder, accurate readings
of this parameter are required to be transmitted to the ground
via the spacecraft telemetry system.
	 How-ever, the telemetry data
are so sensitive to temperature variations that an uncertainty
exists in the readings.
	 Because of this problem, the Wallops
Station personnel assess the delay determinations using the telem-
etry technique to be accurate only to about
	 30 nanoseconds and,
therefore, have abandoned this technique.
3.12	 PASSIVE REFLECTOR
Because the predominant C-Band tracking to date has been in
the transponder mode, there is insufficient data available to
fully evaluate the passive radar reflector.
	 The reflector has
been tracked,. however, on a few occasions by Wallops Station and
AFETR.	 A l -'though deep nulls were recorded during the tracks, the
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fact that passive tracks were accomplished suggests that the re-
flector is adding to the spacecraft radar target area.
It is expected that Wallops Station will have a report forth-
coming in this area.
3.13	 SECOR TRANSPONDER
A radio frequency interference problem was detected during
the GEOS-II ground testing causing interference to the SECOR
transponder system.	 It was determined by APL that the primary
cause was a mixing of the 224.5-MHz and/or 449-MHz SECOR trans-
mitter frequencies with the fundamental and/or second harmonic
of the 324-MHz doppler beacon frequency producing an RF very near
420.9 MHz, the SECOR transponder receiver frequency.
	
This condi-
tion caused distortion of the SECOR data.
To rectify this problem, APL used a bandpass filter with
traps at 224.5 MHz and 449 MHz on the output of the 324-MHz trans-
mitten.	 This solution was effective, however, some low level
interference was still present.
Additional tests were performed prior to launch to determine rt
if the remaining interference would affect SECOR data quality.
The results were that the SECOR ground station power capability
would completely override the interference and, therefore, ca.use
no data distortion.
SECOR in -orbit tracking of GEOS-II has proven that the inter-
ference can be overridden during an interrogation.	 Because of the
four station sequential mode of operation of the SECOR system,
however, the transponder is not being interrogated continuously.
Therefore, during the one to two millisecond dead time between,
station interrogations, the interference is seen as oscillations
or blooming and does affect data quality.
	 Also, during the acqui-
sition phase of the four station SECOR tracking, all stations are
not synchronized in their proper time slots immediately.
	
This is
a normal acquisition condition. 	 In the case of the GEOS trans-
ponder, however, the dead periods caused because a particular
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station is not interrogating, or is not synchronized properly in
the allocated slot, results In undesirable oscillations due to
interference, which pose an operational problem. Because of this
condition, four station acquisition is much more difficult.
To rectify the four station acquisition problem, SECOR per-
sonnel have modified the station equipment so that one station
can effectively simulate a four station interrogation, thus,
allowing no dead time for oscillations to occur while the other
three stations are adjusting to the proper time slots.	 This mod-
ification has been effective in satisfying the problem.
To rectify the problem after all four stations are adjusted
in their proper time slots, another modification has been added
to lengthen the interrogation period of each station so that one
RF uplink overlaps the next in tLtie, which results in no dead
period between station interrogations.	 This modification has
also been effective.
In every other respect, the GEOS-II SECOR system has oper-
sr
ated completely as expe(ited.
3.14	 GRARR TRANSPONDER
There have been no reports of anomalous operation with this
system.	 The Goddard Range and Range Rate stations have routinely
tracked the transponder since the initiation of mission opera-
tions with nominal results.
3.15	 SOLAR SCIENCE ELECTRON DETECTOR (SSED)
The magnetic field detection portion of the SSED has oper-
ated as expected.	 However, the electron detector itself has not
it operated properly since launch.	 An arcing problem in the high
voltage module is considered by APL to be the probable cause of Ilk
this failure.
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APPENDIX A
ABNORMALITIES IN RECEIVED SIGNAL AT THE WALLOPS STATION
C-BAND RADARS FROM THE GEOS-II TRANSPONDERS
by
A. R Selser/NASA-Wallops Station
,August 1, 1968
The data used in this report was collected during the Collo-
cation Project at Wallops Station from the FPQ-6 and FPS-16
radars. During this project the Wallops Station radars tracked
109 passes: fifty-four on the long delay transponder and fifty-
five on the short delay transponder. The radar data outputs used
were the analog AGO records, digitized AGO, and pulse- to-pulse
film recording of non-track video (non -track video is ungated and
does not have AGO applied) . Due to the high speed of the pulse-
to-pulse camera, only about two minutes of film data is available
for passes in which this type of data was recorded. The radars
nominally obtain eighteen minutes of metric data per pass; thus,
the film data represents only a small portion of the ,pass during
which it was recorded.
The items discussed are separated into four categories: sig-
nal fade, drop-out, c'ountdown,and other. Examples of most items
are available on film.
r E	
1.	 Signal Fade - A signal fade is a long term decrease in {
-	 signal amplitude	 and is usually accompanied by a return to theyk	 previous signal lever.	 Fade durations nominally ranged from
twenty seconds to two minutes.
	
Film data shows that fades are
not the result of missing pulses, but are gradual charges in re-
turn pulse amplitude.	 The typical depth of fade is ten decibels : 	 I
(dB).	 Fades are characteristic of both transponders
	 and are
seen by both radars at the same time.
	 They appear to be a func-
tion of satellite aspect angle.
	 This indicates that they are
caused by lobing in the transponder antenna patterns.
	
Antenna
I,	 patterns run by the Applied Physics Laboratory on the GEOS-B
mock-up show that patterns cut in certain planes across the
A-15 y
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satellite have severe lobing with depth of null greater than 10
dB in isolated cases.
	 These antenna patterns and all Wallops
tracks during the Collocation Project were run in linear polari-
zation.
During revolution I.,237,the EPS-16 lost track during a fade.
The same fade caused the FPO,,-6 Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) to
drop to 16 dB.	 It cannot be determined whether loss of track was
due to failure of the FPS-16 to interrogate the transponder, or
the signal was too weak to be detected.	 During revolution 2,118,
the FPS-16 SNR dropped to 1 dB and the FPQ-6 SNR dropped to 13 dB;
neither radar lost track in this fade. 	 These are the two worst
cases for fades and both were on the long delay transponder.
	 AGC
records show that the received SNR of the two radars normally
at
differed by 5-13 dB.
2.	 Drop-Out - A drop-out is a sudden loss of return signal
which, if its duration is longer than two seconds, will cause the
radar to lose track.	 Typical durations range from a few tenths
of one second to several seconds. 	 Many of the drop-outs have It
been about two seconds long, but the ones which last longer cause
the radar to lose track making it impossible to determine when
the signal actually returned.
Table A-1 lists the passes during which Wallops Station radars
experienced one or more drop-outs, the origin of which cannot be
determined.	 In isolated cases drop-outs occurred that were
directly attributed to a malfunction in the radar system; these
are not included in the table. 	 Note in the table that there are
twelve passes in which both radars were beacon tracking simul-
taneously and only one had a drop -out.	 Listed in Table A-1 are
revolution number, transponder, the radar affected by and number
of drop-outs, the status of the other radar at the time of the
drop-outs, and the effective beacon pulse repetition frequency
(PRF) the instant before the drop-out occurved.
The cause of these drop-outs has not been determined; how-
ever, the fact that the worst cases arise when one radar is
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tracking at a PRF of 160 indicates that there might be a PRF re-
lationship.
	 Conversation with personnel at the Ve ga Precision
Laboratories, Incorporated, the transponder manufacturer, has
resulted in the theory that for certain spacecraft conditions the
high voltage cutoff circuit in the transponder may
_	 p	 Y be in mar-
ginal operation at a PRF of 160. 	 Several times when the FPQ-6
had experienced a drop -out, the operator selected a 640 PRF and
the transponder replied immediately.
Three drop-outs have been recorded on film:
	 one each during,
revolutions 2,052 and 2,079 for the FPQ -6, and one in revolution
2 0 118 for
 the FPS-16.	 In revolution 2,052, the FPQ-6 reply pulse
amplitude dropped on a pulse-to-pulse basis from a 35 dB SNR to	 r'
I	 noise in about 5 PRF intervals (approximately 31 milliseconds) .
There were no missing pulses (countdown) during that interval.
In revolution 2,079, the same type sequence occurred to the FPQ-6{
`	 in about 7 PRF intervals (approximately 44 milliseconds) .
	
In
both of these cases the FPQ-6 was the only tracking radar.
	 Vega
#x 
personnel feel that this could be caused by having the power cut-
off from the transponder ,
 s transmitter.
	 This in turn, could be
the result of a failure in the high voltage cutoff circuit.
	 In	 ^	 J
revolution 2,118 the FPS -16 had something different happen.	 The
reply signal was constant in amplitude with a SNR of 20 dB.#
Countdown ( missing pulses) began to appear, randomly at first,
and then became severe until no replies were seen by the radar.
The sequence lasted about 2.5 seconds from the time countdown
first appeared until the pulses completely disappeared.
	
During
the countdown sequence the reply pulses, when present, were all
the same amplitude.
	 Both the FPQ -6 and FPS-16 tracked this pass,
but only the FPS-16 experienced the drop-out.
So far most of the drop -out problems have been with the long
delay transponder, and the worst cases for -drop -outs have been
when the FPQ -6 was tracking alone on that transponder.	 Of the	 t}^	 I
iw
109 Collocation tracks, the FPQ-6 tracked alone seventeen times:
six on the long delay, and eleven on the short delay transponder.
i
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Of those six long delay transponder tracks, four had serious drop-
out problems, while none of the eleven short delay tracks had a
single drop -out.
3.	 Countdown - Countdown is defined as randomly spaced miss-
in 	 pulses.	 Both radars have experienced countdown from both
transponders.
	 Some tracks had none ., while other tracks had many
missing pulses.	 Both radars experienced about the same amount of
countdown per pass.	 Countdown can be seen on the analog AGC
record and on pulse-to-pulse film, and both records of the same
pass correlate in time for missing pulses.
So far in the GEOS-II program countdown has not been a prob-
lem.	 Even in tracks when countdown was termed severe the per-
centage of missing pL'.lses to total interrogations was usually less
than O.OA6, which is 100 times better than that specification for
the transponder.
Once in a while a single reply pulse appeared approximately is
8 microseconds ahead of where it should have been.
	 This has been
seen on film five times:	 three times on the long delay and two
times on the short delay transponder.
	 it must be remembered that
the film data represents only a small portion of the total track
time, so this type of event may have happened more times.	 When
the range pulse appears early, it looks like countdown to the
radar tracking system because the pulse is not in the range gate.
Talks with Vega indicate that noise may have set the 8-micro-
second decoder in the transponder enabling it to reply to the
first pulse in the interrogation code.
	 This is one cause of
countdown, but the film data indicates that it is a minor cause.
Most of the countdown is the result of something else.
It is not known at this time whether countdown and drop-outs
are related as to their causes. 	 An effort is being made now to
determine if missing pulses are the fault of the radars ., the
transponders, or both.
4.	 Other Abnormalities
a.	 Occasionally missing pulses appeared in groups of
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ttwo to four. This type of event happened more often to the FPS-
16 and FPQ-6. It is usually caused by radar phasing, when more
than one radar is tracking, or by some kind of Interference, the
origin of which has not been determined.
b. Once in a while one or two extra pulses appeared
after the range pulse, approximately 2 to 8 microseconds later.
The ca'ase of these is unknown; however., they were probably the
result of random noise in the radar system. These extra pulses
did not affect the tracker because they were outside the range
gate.
c. The radar operators have had scattered problems,
such as the transponder replying three minutes late or being cut-
off early. These problems were few and appeared to be operations
oriented. They will not be discussed here.
This report has attempted to show the types of problems the
Wallops Station C-Band radars have encountered tracking the
GEOS-II transponders and offers some possible causes; although,
at this time, it,
 is not possible to draw any significant conclu-
sions as to the causes of these problems.
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